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COMMENT
AND CORRESPONDENCE
COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
To the Editors:
I would like to take this opportunity to respond to a note in a recent issue
of the University of Notre Dame Law School Journal of Legislation entitled
"Competition in the Telephone Industry: What Will Congress Permit?" by M.
Kathleen Curran.* I am pleased that Ms. Curran and the Journal have
recognized the importance of the current debate on telecommunications policies.
Although Ms. Curran has endeavored to present the position of the telephone
companies, the specialized carriers, and the interconnect industry, subsequent
developments enable me to provide a more up-to-day summary of the position
of the telephone industry in the debate on competition in telecommunications
currently taking place in Congress. Furthermore, several incorrect and confusing
statements contained in Ms. Curran's note will be addressed.
The debate on the issues raised by the introduction of competition in the
telecommunications industry has changed dramatically since the time that Ms.
Curran's note was written. The Consumer Communications Reform Act (CCRA),
which Ms. Curran discusses at length, and in many respects inaccurately, has
accomplished much since its introduction in March, 1976. It placed the issues
before Congress, it focused on the industry dilemma, it created public interest
and concern, and it set in motion the process for identification of the facts,
options and trade-offs necessary to resolve the critical issues facing the
telecommunications industry today. It has achieved its intended purpose. Changes
almost always occur when bills move through the legislative process, and the
Bell System does not expect the CCRA to be passed as originally introduced.
Thus, I will concentrate on contemporary issues rather than dwell on misstatements
or misapprehensions of a legislative proposal no longer under active consideration.
The current debate in Congress, as Ms. Curran accurately recognizes,
concerns competition with the established telephone companies in two distinct
areas: (1) the provision of telephone terminal equipment such as telephone
sets, automatic telephone answerers and PBX equipment, and (2) the transmission
of long distance or intercity communications. This discussion, therefore, will
be organized under those two general areas in which competition. in the
provision of telecommunications service has emerged.
Terminal Equipment
In recent hearings before Congress,' there was, as Ms. Curran recognized,
universal agreement among witnesses that no natural monopoly exists in the
manufacture or supply of telephone terminal equipment. The discussions,
*4 J. Legis. 132 (1977).

1.

Panel Discussions on Domestic Common Carrier Policy Issues, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Subcommittee on Communications (Van Deerlin - D., Cal., Chairman), September 21, 26, 27, 28,
1977.
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therefore, focused on protection of service quality and on ways to insure full
and fair competition in the supply of equipment.
Historically, regulatory bodies have required telephone companies to provide
end-to-end telephone service, including telephone terminal equipment such as
telephone sets. Thus, until recently essentially all telephone terminal equipment
was provided by telephone companies under terms, conditions and rates regulated
by state authorities. In the last decade, the FCC has embarked upon a policy
of encouraging competition in the terminal equipment market. However, the
idea of indiscriminate attachment to the telephone network of hardware of
varying manufacture was universally recognized as unworkable. The FCC has
acknowledged the need to protect the netWork from the physical and technical
harms possible under such an open system, in recognition of the fact that
such indiscriminate attachment would result in poorer telephone service.
Initially the telephone industry responded to the FCC's encouragement of
competition in the terminal equipment area by permitting complete interconnection
of customer-provided equipment if the attachment was made through a protective
connecting arrangement. Later the telephone companies expanded that concept
by permitting certain additional types of equipment to be interconnected to
the network without a physical protective connecting arrangement. The FCC
has further expanded the types of equipment which can be directly connected
to the network in what has become known as its "Registration Program."
Under this program customers are allowed to connect terminal equipment,
including telephones, directly to the network if that equipment is registered
with the FCC as complying with prescribed standards. In hearings before
Congress telephone company witnesses restated their opinions with respect to
the shortcomings and hazards of the program and outlined suggested, changes
which they felt should be incorporated into the program to minimize the
impact with respect to telephone service for the single line customer. Those
2
suggestions are known as the primary. instrument concept.
The adoption of the Registration Program significantly changes the balance
in the jurisdictional responsibilities between the FCC and the state public
service commissions concerning telephone terminal equipment. In preempting
jurisdiction from the states in this area the FCC has substantially enlarged
the scope of its control over the provision of telecommunications service.
The primary issue which remains with respect to terminal equipment is
the proper balance to preserve high quality service while allowing the consumer
freedom of choice. To a great extent, this goal rests on preserving both the
integrity of the nationwide network, and on end-to-end responsibility and
accountability. The industry sponsored primary instrument concept would go
far in preserving high quality service without significantly burdening competition
or restricting. consumer choice. Under this concept telephone companies would
be required to provide and maintain a telephone instrument, as part of basic
telephone service, to single line customers. 3 All other telephone terminal
equipment could be obtained from any qualified supplier.
2.
3.

A comprehensive telephone industry paper on the primary instrument concept was provided to both
houses of Congress on August 16, 1977.
The objectives of the primary instrument 'concept are: to make one serving entity responsible and
accountable for providing complete basic telephone service for single line voice subscribers; to assure
continuity of such telephone service; to facilitate testing, both static and functional; to serve as a
reference set to allow the customer independently to diagnose trouble responsibility; to permit and
encourage customers to effect prompt repair of malfunctioning equipment without interruption of basic
telephone service, and to permit orderly introduction of technological innovations in the telephone
network.
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Intercity Transmission
The current debate in Congress primarily concerns competition in the
provision of intercity communications. Ms. Curran's note incorrectly assumes,
and in several instances states, that competition in the intercity or long distance
transmission field is limited to private line services making use of new technology
and primarily for the transmission of data signals. Thus, Ms. Curran speaks
of "lucrative new markets" and "the specialized common carrier, [which] wants
to offer business data transmission of non-voice communications, utilizing
microwaves or laser beams that operate at much higher frequency than telephone
wires," whose offerings "will not compete directly with the basic voice telephone
service of the telephone industry." That simply is not the case. 4
So-called "private line" services do compete in varying degree with basic
voice telephone service. That is the nub of the problem. For many customers,
private line services are available which are directly substitutable for ordinary
long distance service, a fact which was recognized by several participants in
recent Congressional testimony. 5 In fact, recent technological advances and
regulatory decisions have increased that substitutability to the extent that in
the foreseeable future it may not be possible to functionally distinguish between
many different types of service.
Moreover, even the limitation of competition to private line service is now
under attack. While the FCC's Specialized Carrier6 decision clearly stated
that it was not authorizing specialized carriers to provide services in direct
competition with the basic public message services such as long distance
message toll service (MTS) and wide area telephone service (WATS) offered
by the established telephone companies, some specialized carriers have attempted
to offer services which are almost identical to MTS and WATS. The legitimacy
of these efforts by the specialized carriers to obtain unlimited authority to
provide ordinary long distance service on a competitive basis is currently before
7
the United States Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.
Thus, the intercity competition issue before Congress is not, as Ms. Curran
suggests, limited to private line data service or even private line services
generally. The problem is whether specialized carriers should be permitted to
compete with the established carriers in providing all types of intercity
transmission. At stake in this question are several fundamental factors which
4.

5.
6.
7.

The Bell System does not oppose multiple supply of truly "specialized" private line services, such as
those suggested by Ms. Curran. In 1971, during remarks at AT&T's annual shareholders meeting,
then AT&T Chairman H. I. Romnes stated what has consistently been the Bell System's expectations
and position with respect to "specialized carriers":
"[The special position of public trust imposed upon the Bell System] requires that we recognize
that not all of communications is 'ours' and that in circumstances where others are ready,
willing and able to meet particular needs without impairing the interests of the whole public
they ought to have the opportunity to do so. At the same time, whenever policies are proposed
- by politicians or by regulators or by would-be competitors - that would impair the usefulness
of the network to the public or would add unnecessarily to its costs, our public responsibility
requires us to speak out just as vigorously as we know how."
Stenographic Transcript of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications, House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, September 21, 26, 27 and 28, 1977 (hereinafter Subcommittee
Transcripts): TR 17:50, 88, 140; 18:32-35; 20:11-12, 80-82.
Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, reconsideration denied, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106
(1971), affd sub nom. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
Execunet services currently being offered by MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI) was found
by the FCC to be an unauthorized message toll service. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held,
however, that the FCC did not limit the use of existing facilities to private line services, and therefore
MCI could provide MTS or WATS type services over its existing facilities. MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC, 56 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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have contributed to achieving, and ultimately will affect the preservation of,
the national goals 8 of high-quality, low-cost, widely available telephone service
in this country: (1) the use of revenues from intercity long distance toll service
to help support basic local service and (2) the use of average pricing.
The capability of achieving these goals is directly affected by competition.
Change in the emphasis" placed on these goals will require substantial trade-offs
within the telecommunications market. This dilemma, for the most part, results
from economic realities which, in a truly competitive environment, conflict
with and would prevent full realization of the agreed upon ultimate social
goals. These economic realities were discussed at length by witnesses before
Congressional committees, and can be summarized as follows:
1. Extensive substitutability (cross-elasticity) exists among services offered by
telephone companies and specialized carriers in intercity markets, especially
for business customers.
2. Nationwide cost averaged rate structures for interstate long distance services,
which keep the price of service uniform in all geographic areas, and promote
universally available and affordable services, cannot be maintained in a
competitive environment. Selective competitive entry exacerbates the problem.
3. Economies of scope and scale exist in the provision of telephone services
which, if negated or foregone will raise costs of services, and may delay
implementation of new technology.
4. System planning and engineering of a technically intergrated network
promote high-quality service, economic efficiency and orderly implementation
of new technologies all of which could be disrupted by competitive
interconnected networks.
In order to understand the full impact of these economic realities on
national goals, it is necessary to assess their general effects on the average
users of telecommunications services. First, rates for basic local service may
rise. Telephone service is priced so that intercity calls contribute to keeping
local service rates lower than they otherwise would be. An important element
in achieving this result is the process called "Separations" which is prescribed
by FCC Rules.
The basic telephone and line from the subscribers premises to the telephone
central office are used to make and receive both interstate and intrastate toll
calls and local calls. In recognition of this common use of such access facilities,
the separations process provides for shifting part of the cost responsibility for
these facilities from the subscribers of basic exchange services to the interstate
message toll users. 9 Revenues from regular interstate long distance message
service10 were used to help" cover in excess of $3.5 billion of joint costs last
year.
8.

Participants in the Congressional investigations regarding telecommunications policy issues have endorsed

these national goals set out as the purpose of the Communications Act of 1934 " . . . to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and
world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges . .."
(Section 1) as valid and appropriate for the future. See: Subcommittee Transcripts, TR 17:9-10, 18,
22, 36, 84, 128; 20:12, 49.
9. The separations process is promulgated by the FCC as Part 67 of its Rules. The processes and
formulae prescribed by these Rules are the result of an FCC Joint Board proceeding with representatives
of state regulatory authorities (NARUC) and the FCC. It is a political compromise which recognizes
the public interest benefits of sharing the economies inherent in the joint use of facilities. The shift
does not result in a subsidy, but rather is a process for recognition and recovery of the joint and
common costs of providing the several services.
10. Revenues from private line services - whether provided by specialized carriers, Bell or independent
telephone companies - are not included in the separation process under current FCC Rules.
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Competition affects the amount of interstate revenues available to cover a
portion of these joint customer line costs. The amount available will be reduced
as customer usage shifts from regular long distance service to competitive
services and as the telephone companies lower long distance rates in response
to competition. The only place telephone companies do not have direct
competition is in basic local telephone service. It is axiomatic, therefore, that
local telephone rates ultimately will have to rise in order to cover customer
line costs.
Current separations rules exacerbate the effect because they limit the ability
of telephone companies to price their services competitively. The problem is
particularly acute because of two factors: first, the separations process applies
only to telephone company services, and second, the allocation process used
with respect to those services is based on relative usage of jointly used facilities,
even though most of those costs are fixed and not related to the amount of
use (i.e., not economically relevant to usage). Because the costs allocated are
not directly related to the services used, an arbitrary burden is created;
especially
for the frequent or heavy user of message toll services.
Since there
is substantial substitutability (cross-elasticity) among interstate
services, 'significant shifts of demand from' message toll services occur. As
competition in private line services forces rates toward direct costs, the
substitution becomes greater, since the disparity between rates for competitively
supplied services and toll calls widens. The result is predicatable and inevitable:
where a service bears an artificial burden, either the burden will have to be
removed or the burdened service will lose most of its business.
Thus the dilemma: incompatible social and economic goals. Full competition
in intercity services will severely limit the ability of message toll services to
support the social goal of universally affordable basic service. A change in
the separation procedure which would include all intercity carriers and services
would tend to reduce the cross-elastic impact between toll services and private
line services. While such change would help effectuate current social policy,
that alone is not a solution to the dilemma raised by multiple supply of
intercity services. It would create problems of how to determine an equitable
and economically relevant burden on competitive services provided by competitive
carriers using different rate structures, and entirely fails to address the problem
of the impact of selective route competition upon uniform averaged rates, as
discussed below. Any modifications of the separations process must ultimately
determine whether it remains in the public interest to use revenues from
interstate services to help keep basic telephone rates lower than they otherwise
would be; if so, to what extent should which services provided by which carriers
to which customers be arbitrarily burdened in order to meet that objective;
and, then, whether such results are economically realistic and attainable in an
environment of full and fair competition or whether they are attainable only
under regulatory concepts inconsistent with free competition.
A second dilemma (between economic and social goals) as a result of
multiple supply of intercity services arises because nationwide averaged rates
cannot be maintained in a truly competitive environment.
Telephone companies are required by the FCC to provide service to all
customers and locations within their franchised areas. Further, telephone
companies are required to price interstate toll services on the basis of nationwide
averaged costs (i.e., the telephone customer pays the same rate for interstate
calls of the same distance regardless of the geographical location of the
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telephones engaged, the route transversed or the underlying specific costs of
providing the service),." However, there is a great disparity between actual
route costs and averaged costs since average costs include some routes where
specific costs are higher than the average and others where they are lower.
Actual route costs between the largest metropolitan centers are sometimes less
than $1.00 per circuit mile, while the costs to remote towns and villages may
exceed $200.00 per circuit mile.
Traffic between the 32 major metropolitan areas now accounts for half
the interstate revenues from businesses. Specialized common carriers are
presently allowed selectively to serve only the routes of their choice. Their
primary offerings have been to business customers located along routes between
major metropolitan centers. So long as specialized common carriers continue
in this fashion, the nationwide averaged rate schedule provides them a protective
umbrella. They can "skim the cream" on the higher demand lower cost routes
and leave the low density higher cost routes to be served by the carriers of
last resort - the telephone companies. As that occurs, the disparity widens
between averaged costs and acutal costs on high density routes, thus enlarging
the protective umbrella.
The ability to maintain the present system of averaged rates under current
conditions is seriously in question. Likewise, requiring telephone companies to
provide equal service to everyone while allowing competing carriers to choose
to ignore high cost routes prevents full and fair competition. The current form
of rate averaging, which makes long distance calling widely available at
affordable rates, is inconsistent with fair competition. There is a basic
incompatibility between true competition and universal service at affordable
rates to all subscribers.
If rate deaveraging occurs, as it inevitably must under conditions of selective
competition, the result will be higher rates for some customers and lower rates
for others. Higher rates will generally fall on those business subscribers who
are not in major metropolitan centers, and on those who are only occasional
users of long distance services - primarily residential customers. The chief
beneficiaries of deaveraged rates will be the large users in major metropolitan
centers, primarily those business customers with needs for bulk or continuous
services.
A third area of dilemma where economic realities clash with social goals
is industry structure and the economies and efficiencies associated with an
integrated nationwide network. Intercity services provided over a unitary network
exhibit efficiencies associated with system planning and common use of facilities
together with significant economies of scale and scope.
The nationwide network is engineered on the basis of economic trade-offs.
Fragmentation of end-to-end service would undermine full system planning and
produce economic incentives to minimize individual supplier costs to the
detriment of total system control and quality. In a competitive environment
there is incentive to shift expenses and responsibility to other suppliers. To
the extent that shift causes economic inefficiencies, total costs rise; to the
extent it causes suboptimal engineering, service quality and costs suffer. Further,
the customers' ability to assess responsibility, require accountability and obtain
relief are limited.
11.

Dept. of Pub. Serv. of Wash. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. et al., 8 F.C.C. 342 (1941).
Comments of AT&T, F.C.C. Docket No. 18920, pp. 65-70 (Oct. 1, 1970).

See

also:
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A final dilemma is the extent to which true competition is even possible
in the current environment. Any artificial maintenance of multiple supply
through statutory or regulatory segmentation of markets or handicapping of
suppliers would produce a cartel arrangement and undercut the basis for
competition. The result must be an increase in the overall cost of telecommunications
services without the beneifits associated with full and fair competition.
True competition cannot exist in an enviroment which exhibits natural.
monopoly characteristics, except in peripheral areas where other efficiencies
may outweigh the economies inherent in meeting concentrated demand. There
are specialized and value-added services which may well. have a place in the
provision of intercity services, but indications are that the extent of multiple
supply which now exists cannot be maintained if economic pricing is allowed
to reflect the true economies and efficiencies inherent in the integrated switched
network.
Arguments of full and fair competition based on fully distributed costs
and the professed need for inefficient separate subsidiaries which would prevent
realization of the full economic efficiencies highlights the concerns of the
proponents' for "competition" in its present form. Accounting principles and
allocation methodologies which are not economically relevant to pricing decisions
in an-unregulated competitive world only obscure the issue.
Clearly, until Congress either prescribes competition based on sound economic
principles or acknowledges the natural monopoly characteristics of intercity
services and defines the appropriate boundaries of regulation, the controversy
will continue at the expense of the ratepayer. Costs of regulatory proceedings
will increase, delays will persist and a cartel arrangement with market sharing
will emerge. The concept of competition is not readily reconciliable with the
concept of regulation. In a competitive environment entrepreneurs are free to
decide what markets to enter or exit, when to inject new capital and what
prices to charge. This is not the case under regulation. An attempt to merge
these two economic concepts, which are to some extent incompatible, is likely
to deprive the public of the full benefits of either competition or regulation.
Conclusion
To further focus on the CCRA only steps backward. Although numerous
problems remain which will require social and economic trade-offs, and although
considerable disagreement exists over how the trade-offs should be balanced,
the Congressional investigation on telecommunications policy has provided the
forum and the framework which has identified and substantially narrowed the
issues.
The hearings and panel discussions before Congress have produced nearly
universal consensus that competition with multiple supply of equipment and
services is desirable to the extent it does not significantly impair the standards
used to measure the public interest: high quality, universally available, reasonably
priced service.
These standards provide the guidelines and framework within which the
complex process of deciding interrelated problems can be reduced to one of
balancing trade-offs. They require those with diverse and conflicting interests
to focus on a common denominator - achievement of the ultimate public
interest goals. From major decisions which affect the entire industry structure
to procedural modifications which effectuate that policy, these policy goals
should be the foundation of future telecommunication policy.
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In response to that end, the telephone industry has advanced the primary
instrument concept for terminal equipment supply, and its task force
recommendations 12 for resolution of the intercity services dilemma. Both proposals
attempt to accommodate competition, consistent with the basic public interest
standards contained in the Communications Act. Whether Congress and our
regulators will agree that those proposals strike the appropriate balance is yet
to be determined; however, there is little doubt that progress toward resolution
of the issues is continuing.
John F. Preston, Jr.
Associate General Counsel
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
New York, December 20, 1977

12. On December 1, 1977, the telephone industry submitted to Congress a proposal for structuring the
provision of telecommunications services in this country. This proposal, which attempts to reconcile
the desire to maintain lower rates for basic residential and rural telephone customers with the desire
to widen the availability of customer choice of telecommunications services and suppliers, recommends
placement of telecommunications services into various categories where they will be subject to differing
regulatory, ratemaking, accounting, and financial practices and policies suitable to each category.
Basically, four categories are envisioned:
1. Regular local and long distance public communications service would continue to be provided
by the regulated telephone industry. Long distance rates would continue to be averaged nationwide to
keep costs to rural areas down; long distance revenues would continue to help keep the cost of basic
local service down.
2. Special communications networks connecting various locations of a customer - such as the
various plants or offices of a large company - would be provided by a regulated telephone company,
a specialized carrier, or by the customer. These special networks could be connected to services in
the nationwide public network, but only at customer locations such as an office switchboard. There
would be a charge for the capability of connecting to public network services and that charge would
go towards helping keep down the cost of local service.
3. A separate category would provide for private communications systems that are not connectable
to public network services. Such systems could be provided by a regulated telephone company, a
specialized carrier, or by the customer.
4. Certain terminai equipment and systems, such as switchboards and phones at customer
locations and mobile radio, would continue to have direct access to nationwide network services.
The recommendation calls for a transitional period during which present services which do not fit into
the new framework would gradually be phased out or reconfigured to bring them under one of the
four categories.
Under this proposal, competing networks would be able to continue to offer a wider variety of services
designed to meet specialized needs. Even though nontelephone company carriers would, however, have
an increasing share of intercity business, the erosion of support for lower residential and rural rates
would be slower than under the present trend.
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
BY INDIANA'S PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

To the Editors:
Prof. Rodolpho Sandoval's
recent article in the Journal of
Legislation* was a thoughtful and thorough review of proposed public employee
collective bargaining legislation in Indiana's General Assembly and reflected
tenacious research. The emphasis in the article was on the fate of Senate Bill
61 which was, in effect, a reenactment of House Bill 1298 (Public Law 254),
passed by the 1975 Session, and ruled unconstitutional by a Benton County
Circuit Court. Senate Bill 61 was authored by Senator Robert Fair and myself,
with Senator William Christy, chairman of the Senate's Labor and Pensions
Committee, as co-author.
House Bill 1298 was the first comprehensive collective bargaining bill for
public employees passed by the General Assembly. It was approved by a vote
of 69-26 in the House and a 35-15 vote in the Senate. House co-sponsors
were Representatives J. P. Harris and J. G. Harris; Senate co-authors were
Senator Fair and myself.
Public Law 217, passed during the 1973 Session, granted the right of
collective bargaining to a specific group of public employees; namely, to
full-time certified public school teachers, although the scope of bargaining was
restricted to "salary wages, hours and salary and wage-related fringe benefits".
Impasse resolution under this Public Law 217 is limited to non-binding
fact finding and mediation only; there are no provisions for mandatory arbitration
of impasses. By contrast, House Bill 1298 and Senate Bill 61 provided for
unlimited scope of bargaining and impasse resolution as discussed in Professor
Sandoval's well-documented article.
Senate Bill 61 was drafted to meet the constitutional objections raised by
the Benton County Circuit Court. On second reading in the Senate, 19
amendments were offered and four motions prevailed, three by -voice vote. A
motion of Senator Joseph Harrison prevailed on a roll call vote. This motion
changed the employee representation election process by requiring a secret
ballot, mandating the words "no" or "neither" appear on the ballot, and
stipulating the exclusive representative be selected by a majority of all the
employees eligible to vote in the "most appropriate" unit. The roll call ended
in a tie of 23-23, the Lt. Governor breaking the deadlock. A motion containing
several technical changes, offered by Senator Fair, was approved by voice vote.
The one offered by Senator Merton Stanley precluded the parties from ratifying
a contract calling for expenditures of funds in excess of monies legally available
to a local unit of government, or requiring a reduction or elimination of other
governmental services. This amendment prohibited an employee organization
from bargaining for a settlement resulting in a deficit budget and also required
the exclusive representative to notify a unit of government of its intent to
bargain for salaries and related benefits 120 days prior to budget consideration.
Senator Stanley's amendment was more restrictive than that included in House
Bill 1298 as it prohibited negotiating the transfer of other available funds to
pay for increased wages and fringe benefits. The amendment adopted was
*Rodolpho Sandoval, Public Employees' Right to Collective Bargaining: The Need for Legislative Action
in Indiana, 4 J. Legis. 39 (1977).
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offered by Senator Joseph Bruggenschmidt and required all meetings of either
party and all bargaining sessions be opened to the public, the so-called sunshine
amendment.
Senate Bill 61 was approved on roll call #123 by a vote of 28-22, primarily
along party lines, with 25 Democrats and 3 Republicans voting for it and 19
Republicans and 3 Democrats opposed. Two years previously, House Bill 1298
was approved by a Senate vote of 24 Democrats and 11 Republicans, with
only 1 Democrat and 14 Republicans opposed. This shift in Senate Republican
votes, in my opinion, reflected a general change in public attitude against
collective bargaining for public employees. This attitude has been hardened in
recent months by threatened work stoppage and similar activities by public
employees throughout the State.
Senate Bill 61 was referred to the House on February 8, 1977, with
Representatives Gregory Server and J. G. Harris named as co-sponsors. On
March 28, Rep. Server withdrew from sponsorship and Representatives Thomas
Coleman and Robert Alderman were added as co-sponsors. This bill was
assigned to the House Labor Committee, chaired by Rep. Paul Burkley, on
February 28. No action was taken by this committee and the bill never reached
the House floor.
In my judgment, efforts to resurrect Senate Bill 61 during the short 1978
Session will fail and could prove counter-productive. Based on what I perceive
to be a widespread public attitude, any bill that is acceptable to both Houses
this session will be restrictive and repressive. Consequently, I question' if the
subject matter should be considered in 1978. However, if a bill is introduced,
it should start in the House for obvious reasons.
In his conclusion, Professor Sandoval questioned why House Bill 1298 was
enacted with provisions precluding judicial review of certain administrative
determinations; namely, bargaining unit determination by the Indiana Education
Employment Relations Board and certification of employee representation based
on a majority vote in a board-ordered election. When it passed the House,
House Bill 1298 did not prevent court appeals of these board decisions.
The bill was rewritten in the Senate Labor Committee, chaired by then-State
Senator John Shawley. In a recent conversation with Chairman Shawley, he
stated the pasted-up version approved by his committee did allow for Court
review of all board decisions. However, again according to Shawley, when it
was reprinted and presented for second reading amendments, the words "not"
were added to sub-sections (d) and (g) under Section 8, the section covering
the prevention of unfair labor practices. These small, three-letter words altered
the bill substantially, making it vulnerable on constitutional grounds.
Section 8 (g) precluded court review of unit determination with respect to
questions of fact only if those questions of fact were "supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole". Section 8 (d) prevented Court
review of the board's determination that "an employee organization has been
chosen by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit." No one in
the Senate raised objections to these specific changes; perhaps because so many
changes were made in House Bill 1298, they were overlooked.
I was not involved in the rewrite of the bill in the Senate Labor Committee.
In preparing to present the bill on second reading, however, I noted the
sub-sections which prevented court review. At the time, I considered them
insignificant, rationalizing them on the basis of expediting implementation of
the bill's intent by avoiding prolonged court battles. Further, if problems did

19781

Comment and Correspondence

result, I thought the general severability provision in the Indiana Code (IC
1-1-1-8) which allowed a Court to invalidate sections of a law without affecting
the constitutionality of the entire law, would apply. Consequently, I did not
question the proposed restrictions on the judiciary; in retrospect, it was an
obvious error in judgment.
House members concurred, by voice vote, with the changes made in House
Bill 1298 to avoid sending the bill to conference committee and risk losing it
in the press of other legislative matters near the end of the Session.
I believe Senate Bill 61 was an innovative approach to collective bargaining
in the public sector. It legalized the right of public employees to organize and
bargain collectively over wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment;
contained a stringent provision against deficit financing; reenforced a no-strike
provision with an action at law by a public employer and automatic revocation
of dues deduction privileges for one year; set forth unfair labor practices by
the public employers and employee organizations; established methods for
selection and recognizing exclusive employee representation, and provided
methods for resolving impasses.
Under the bill, either party, or the board, could declare an impasse. Either
party could request the appointment of a mediator, or the board could appoint
one on its own volition. If the mediator was unable to affect a settlement,
either party could request their differences be submitted to fact finding with
recommendations. Those recommendations were to be advisory only, unless
within five days after giving or receiving the written request, either party
notified the other that it desired the recommendations to be binding.
If the impasse remained after fact finding, and neither party requested
the recommendations be binding, mandatory arbitration could be requested by
either party. Arbitration was to be conducted by a three-member panel selected
by the parties, arbitration costs being shared equally. Each party was required
to submit to the Board a final and an alternate offer. The panel was restricted
to selecting "the most reasonable, in its judgment, of the final offers submitted
by the parties." The content of these final offers could not contain issues that
were not present at the time of the impasse. To my knowledge, this approach
to mandatory arbitration in the public sector was unique and Indiana would
have pioneered a new concept in impasse settlement.
Throughout his administration, Governor Otis Bowen has supported extending
collective bargaining rights to public employees, providing any legislation contain
a stringent no-strike clause, prevent deficit financing, and preclude bargaining
over funds previously appropriated. Senate Bill 61 met these conditions. It was
unfortunate the language changes, either intentional or unintentional, by an
individual or individuals unknown, created a constitutional issue and prevented
public employees from attaining the right to collectively bargain in Indiana.
In summary, legislators in both Houses who were supportive of public
employee collective bargaining either missed, misinterpreted, were mistaken or
made incorrect assumptions about the amended language, resulting in the
unconstitutionality of House Bill 1298. In my opinion, their collective action
was inadvertent, not intentional.
Robert D. Garton
State Senator, State of Indiana
Chairman, Minority Caucus
Indianapolis, December 21, 1977
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To the Editors:
I have read and examined the Journal of Legislation article by Professor
Rodolpho Sandoval regarding public employees' right to collective bargaining
in Indiana.* The article is both complete and accurate as it pertains to the
contents of P. L. 254 of the Acts of 1975.
In 1977, I introduced Senate Bill 61 which eliminated the preclusion of
judicial review and also contained a severability clause to insure that the main
features of the bill would survive should a section of the bill be struck down.
The bill passed the Democrat-controlled Senate but died in the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives.
In 1978, the same bill will once again be introduced in the Senate. I feel
confident that the bill will pass the Senate, but once again the prospects of
passage in the House are probably not good.
I certainly share Professor Sandoval's feeling that the public employees of
Indiana need and deserve the right to bargain collectively and that they should
have had the right for the last two years.
Robert J. Fair
President Pro Tem
The Senate, State of Indiana
Indianapolis, January 6, 1978
4Rodolpho Sandoval, Public Employees' Right to Collective Bargaining: The Need for Legislative Action
in Indiana, 4 J. Legis. 39 (1977).

SOCIAL LEGISLATION
To the Editors:
I would like to comment on your brief review by Terry A. Crone of
Social Legislation, the second unit of the Labor Law Group coursebook series
published by BNA Books.*
Mr. Crone is absolutely right in his concluding comment: much of this
material "would be difficult to appreciate without. a preexisting substantive
law background in this area." A novice teacher who uses the book for the
first time is likely to find it very tough going, since many of the statutes
treated are complex and slippery, but not well known. A student attempting
to master the material on his or her own with minimal class attendance would,
I think, court disaster.
My intention in preparing these materials was to provide both a small
sampling of cases for teachers who wished to include some of this material
in an introductory labor law course and also an organizing framework for
those wishing to teach a more extensive course, with the expectation that those
teaching the more extensive course would want to use their own supplementary
materials - often a substantial body of local workers compensation law precedent,
for example. I also knew that much of what was included would probably be
out of date very soon, since so many of the statutes involved are only now
*4 J. Legis. 181 (1977).
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being fleshed out by judicial decision. In my own course, I currently use a
supplement which runs more than one hundred pages (a copy of which I
would be happy to send to any instructor using the book).
The most telling criticism of the book is the charge that the note material
is too thin. On the whole, I think Mr. Crone is right in that statement. If a
further edition is prepared, more notes should be included. The present balance
is an indication of my own style of presentation, and would not be comfortable
for all teachers. However, I remain convinced that students read cases with
much more care and if pressed by size constraints to choose between text or
case, I will again prefer the latter.
I would be delighted to receive suggestions from any current users.
Robert N. Covington
Professor of Law
Vanderbilt University School of Law
Nashville, November 15, 1977
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